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Rethinking Optimality in Tort Litigation: The Promise of
Reverse Cost-Shifting
Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Of all the known methods of redressing grievances and settling
disputes—pitched battle, rioting, dueling, mediating, flipping a
coin, suing—only the latter has steadily won the day in the
United States.
- Jethro K. Lieberman, The Litigious Society1
Over the past two decades, policymakers sought to stem the
destructive social effects of the “litigation explosion”2 by developing
alternatives to the familiar “American Rule” of fee-shifting. Fee-shifting
rules offered a promising avenue of reform. Prevailing economic wisdom
held that parties weighed the anticipated benefits and costs of litigating
when determining whether to settle or go to court.3 Hence, rules that
shifted liability for attorneys’ fees between parties invariably influenced
litigation patterns. This power of fee-shifting rules to alter litigation
behavior was manifest in the Congressional practice of attaching feeshifting provisions to statutes establishing important federal rights.4 In
recent times, state politicians have also hoisted the banner of reform,
experimenting with similar rules that shift fees to the “prevailing party”
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1. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY xi (1981)
2. See generally WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 152 (1991).
3. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 501-02 (1991); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989).
4. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 396 (1969); 2 U.S.C. § 1219(3)(d) (1969); 5 U.S.C. § 552b(i)
(1976); 10 U.S.C. § 1089(f)(2) (1976); 12 U.S.C. § 1701q-1(f) (1959).
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in certain classes of civil disputes.5
The objective of state legislators was to develop a “hybrid” feeshifting rule that eliminated the major flaws of the two dominant feeshifting paradigms: the American Rule and the British Rule.6 Critics
argued that the American Rule, which holds each party responsible for its
own legal costs regardless of the outcome, offered few disincentives for
filing frivolous lawsuits. The British Rule, which requires the losing
party in a civil litigation to pay the winning party’s attorney’s fees, was
disparaged for discouraging plaintiffs with small but meritorious claims
from pursuing redress in the courts.
However, two recent trends have impeded the success of efforts to
develop a hybrid fee-shifting scheme by combining elements of both the
American and British Rules. First, legislators in many states, insensitive
to the divergent aims of state tort litigation and cases to enforce federal
statutory rights, have imported boilerplate fee-shifting language from
federal statutes into lawsuits governing state litigation practices. The
insertion of federal fee-shifting provisions into state statutes has
introduced uncertainty into the calculation and awarding of attorney’s
fees, and imposed unwarranted “settlement surpluses” for plaintiffs
resolving their grievances prior to trial.7
The failure of state legislators to formulate fee-shifting rules with

5. In theory, fee-shifting is not the only means of manipulating the volume of tort litigation.
Most states provide common law remedies for filing frivolous lawsuits through the torts of malicious
civil prosecution and abuse of process, see generally W. PAGE KEETON et al., THE LAW OF TORTS
889-96 (5th ed. 1984), and all states enforce the analogue of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Gerald F. Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Court: An Empirical,
Comparative Study, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 313 (1992). Finally, some states recognize an inherent power
of the court to provide limited exceptions to the American Rule. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32 (1991). However, none of these mechanisms are a proper surrogate for a fee-shifting rule
with general application in civil cases. An action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process is
available only if a victorious defendant can prove that the plaintiff litigated maliciously or with an
ulterior motive, a prohibitively difficult burden to satisfy. See Scott S. Partridge et al., A Complaint
Based on Rumors: Countering Frivolous Litigation, 31 LOY. L. REV. 221, 250 (1987). Civil
procedure scholars have pronounced Rule 11 “functionally dead” in the wake of recent revisions, see
Cynthia A. Leiferman, The 1993 Rule 11 Amendments: The Transformation of the Venomous Viper
into the Toothless Tiger?, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 497, 498 (1994), and the states that permit judges to
use inherent powers to deviate from the American Rule sharply restrict the exercise of this authority.
Even in their heyday, these civil remedies only deterred patently meritless litigation. See, e.g.,
Crowely v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083, 1094-95 (Cal. 1994); In re Estate of Keeven, 882 P.2d 457,
465 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); Hearity v. Iowa Dist. Court, 440 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa 1989);
Goodover v. Lindey’s Inc., 843 P.2d 765, 775-76 (Mont. 1992); Lannon v. Lee Conner Realty Corp.,
385 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Va. 1989).
6. See Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public
Interest Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 233 (describing the history and
theory of fee-shifting).
7. See Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 1069, 1084-85 (1993) (noting that bluffing by parties trying to capture a larger portion of the
settlement surplus can lead to negotiation failures) (hereinafter Hylton I).
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predictable, even-handed application sparked a second disturbing trend:
statutory interference with judicial processes to limit or preclude damage
recovery by tort victims. In recent years, commercial defendants have
exerted substantial pressure on politicians for litigation relief in the form
of caps on compensatory and punitive damage awards8 and broad grants
of legal immunity.9
Such initiatives introduce unseemly inequities in the judicial process.
If two plaintiffs suffer severe injuries of equal magnitude, their available
remedies should not differ simply because one defendant is a doctor
defending a medical malpractice suit and the other a wealthy car owner
in a common negligence action. Even with respect to punitive damage
awards (among the heavily criticized features of the tort system) the
notion that industries with political capital can statutorily evade remedies
designed to deter outrageous conduct is unsettling. This politicization of
the remedial process creates an appearance of insensitivity toward
injured plaintiffs and threatens to produce a patchwork remedial scheme
across the spectrum of tortious injury with no principled basis in
common law or common experience.
The reality, however, is that doctors, gun manufacturers, and other
common tort defendants will continue to flex their political muscle and
employ brinksmanship tactics10 until the tort system demonstrates its
capacity to consistently correlate actual outcomes with perceived legal
merit. This Article adopts the premise that fee-shifting rules remain the
most reliable means of inducing such reform across the tort system as a
whole. Specifically, this article proposes that the Reverse-Cost Shifting
(“RCS”) Rule11 provides a unique incentive structure that holds the
greatest promise for soothing the social tremors of the litigation
explosion.
This thesis is presented in six parts. Part II briefly examines the ideal
features of a hybrid fee-shifting rule. Part III discusses the importance of
fee-shifting notwithstanding the views of some scholars that the ill
effects of the “litigation explosion” are overblown. Part IV presents the
American Rule and the British Rule and illustrates how each rule in its
purest form diverges from the ideal. Part V surveys prior efforts of state
legislators to merge elements of the two original rules into a hybrid fee8. See Meredith Matheson Thoms, Comment, Punitive Damages in Texas: Examining the
Need for a Split-Recovery Statute, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 207, 208 (2003).
9. See Carl Hulse, Senate Rejects Effort to Protect Gun Makers and Dealers, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2004, at A1.
10. See Frank J. Vandall, Constricting Products Liability: Reforms in Theory and Procedure,
48 VILL. L. REV. 843, 858 (2003).
11. Ephraim Fischbach & William McLauchlan, Reverse-Cost Shifting: A New Proposal for
Allocating Legal Expenses, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 35 (1998).

320

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 19

shifting scheme and analyzes the consequences of their misguided
incorporation of federal fee-shifting language into state law. Finally, Part
VI reintroduces the Reverse-Cost Shifting (RCS) Rule, and empirically
demonstrates the advantages of this Rule using a game theory model.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF AN IDEAL FEE-SHIFTING RULE
On a micro-judicial level, the function of tort litigation is to restore
both parties as nearly as possible to the position they occupied prior to
the defendant’s violation of legal norms.12 The parties operate under the
legal fiction that the defendant improperly benefited from his tortious
behavior at the plaintiff’s expense and is, therefore, liable for monetary
damages sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for her resulting injuries.
The ideal fee-shifting rule would encourage every wronged plaintiff to
pursue an appropriate remedy no matter how small the claim but ensure
that plaintiffs do not extract a financial windfall that exceeds the
magnitude of their injuries.
As a rule, protracted litigation imposes financial and emotional
burdens that move both parties further from their pre-incident positions
as the trial progresses. Hence, an ideal fee-shifting rule would also
minimize the “transaction costs” of dispute resolution by providing both
parties with equally strong incentives to agree on an appropriate remedy
outside of court, or alternatively, to settle at an early stage in the
litigation. However, many hybrid fee-shifting rules diverge from this
ideal by imposing “one-way” fee shifts to prevailing plaintiffs only,
thereby encouraging plaintiffs to file questionable lawsuits and
discouraging them from settling for an amount that fairly reflects their
injuries.13
The structure of an ideal fee-shifting rule is also informed by macrolevel concerns, including the efficiency of the judicial process, incentives
to conform behavior to legal rules, and the secondary social effects of
litigious behavior. If injured plaintiffs with small damage claims are
systematically deterred from prosecuting those claims (particularly when
they are not amenable to class disposition), tortfeasors have reduced
incentives to comply with legal mandates. The efficiency of the judicial
process is also a function of how parties react to uncertainty in legal
rules—a problem endemic to any system of administering justice. As

12. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and
Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 909-10 (1989) (“There is universal agreement that the
compensatory goal of tort law requires making the successful plaintiff ‘whole. . . .’”).
13. See Susan M. Olson, How Much Access to Justice from State “Equal Access to Justice
Acts”?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 547, 556-57 (1995).
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discussed below, the American Rule, the British Rule and prevalent
hybrids of the two rules encourage parties to “litigate to the hilt” in the
absence of clear, controlling legal precedent. While such behavior is
beneficial if it contributes to development in nascent areas of the law, its
utility is limited in tort. Consequently, an ideal fee-shifting rule would
discourage parties from exploiting uncertainty in the law through pitched
legal battle, and promote extra-judicial means of dispute resolution.
Finally, the social costs of America’s litigious impulse—which range
from playgrounds stripped of equipment to exorbitant medical care
costs14—are a direct consequence of America’s preference for resolving
tort cases in court.15 A fee-shifting rule that discourages parties from
defaulting to the courts as an arbiter of civil disputes will significantly
alleviate the forces that artificially inflate the price and decrease the
availability of commodities that contribute to the quality and
convenience of everyday life.
These macro- and micro-level fee-shifting ideals can be distilled into
a single principle: the ideal fee-shifting rule is one that tilts the litigation
“playing field” along a single axis—the axis of merit. It would not
unduly discourage the litigation of small claims but would discourage
plaintiffs from carrying weak claims to a jury. It would reduce the
potential for irrational jury verdicts or excessive awards by imposing
substantial financial risk on parties who decline to settle their cases
before judgment. In short, it would instigate a sea change in the
administration of the tort system by replacing litigation with settlement
as the primary remedial avenue for plaintiffs.
III. FEE-SHIFTING AS A MEANS OF CONTAINING THE “VERDICT
EXPLOSION”
A sizeable volume of scholarly work empirically challenges the
magnitude of the litigation explosion, concluding that the volume of
cases litigated today does not diverge substantially from earlier periods.16
Without commenting on the validity of this research, it suffices here to
note that the pernicious “tort tax” is not solely a function of the number
of cases litigated (i.e., the “litigation explosion”) but is also influenced
by the unmistakable trend of increasing jury awards in cases that are
14. See Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 34.
15. The rising cost of consumer goods and services attributable to litigious behavior is
commonly referred to as a “tort tax.” See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 4, 11 (1988).
16. See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lynn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2, 5
n.5-6 (2004); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994).
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litigated to a verdict (termed here the “verdict explosion”).17
Theoretically, if the market price for “litigated goods” reflects each
vendor’s individual experiences, contemporary trends toward settlement
and alternative dispute resolution might well reduce the costs of these
goods in aggregate. The sting of large jury verdicts, however, is
primarily absorbed by insurance companies, not individual providers of
goods and services.18 As a rule, insurance companies set their premiums
using risk calculations that incorporate data from their own experiences
as well as those of other participants in the industry.19 If, hypothetically,
plaintiffs in two medical malpractice cases each receive jury verdicts of
$20 million, medical malpractice premiums will soar even if ninety-eight
other malpractice cases settle for reasonable sums.20 Commonsense
business principles dictate that insurance companies conducting the
standard “weighted average” calculation account for the rare cases that
generate large verdicts. The result is that a “verdict explosion”—or small
minority of cases generating enormous jury awards—can induce a tort
tax regardless of whether overall trial frequency rises to the level of a
“litigation explosion.”
Any tort reform strategy aiming to reduce the tort tax must therefore
address litigated cases that produce large jury verdicts, and the
concomitant trend of defendants settling with plaintiffs for unreasonably
high sums to avert such results. Both trends exert economic pressure on
insurance companies that ultimately result in higher premiums. Two
conceivable ways of reducing the resulting tort tax is to place statutory
caps on jury awards, or establish tort immunity for defendants in
particular industries. While such measures may reduce insurance costs by
lowering and stabilizing jury verdicts in these outlying jury cases, they
raise the fundamental fairness concerns outlined above and lead to
irresponsible behavior.

17. This trend is highlighted in a line of recent Supreme Court cases addressing the Due
Process and Eighth Amendment implications of excessive verdicts. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003); Cooper Indus..v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct.
1678 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996); see also Michael Rustad &
Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort
Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1275-76 (1993).
18. See William T. Barker, Lobbying and the American Law Institute: The Example of
Insurance Defense, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 573, 574 (1998); John W. Wade, Should Joint and Several
Liability of Multiple Tortfeasors be Abolished?, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 193, 209 (1986).
19. See Frank A. Sloan & Mahmud Hassan, Equity and Accuracy in Medical Malpractice
Insurance Pricing, 9 J. HEALTH ECON. 289, 292-93 (1990) (discussing risk classification methods
used by medical malpractice insurers); Herbert I. Weisberg & Thomas J. Tomberlin, A Statistical
Perspective on Actuarial Methods for Estimating Pure Premiums from Cross-Classified Data, 49 J.
RISK & INS. 539 (1982).
20. Sloan & Hassan, supra note 19, at 290 (“Policyholders may be homogenous; yet losses
may be concentrated if the adverse outcome has a low probability but high associated loss.”).
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Implementing a fee-shifting rule that creates strong incentives to
settle in every case can also modify an insurer’s risk calculus. Such a rule
offers promise for reform by walking the delicate tightrope between
fairness to plaintiffs and antipathy toward tort taxes by preserving the
option to litigate, but making this choice sufficiently unattractive so that
parties will choose of their own accord to settle. In the final analysis, it is
difficult, if not impossible, for an insurance company to predict ex ante
what types of cases will settle and which will be litigated to an adverse
verdict. But if a fee-shifting rule with universal application discourages
parties from litigating any case to a verdict, insurance companies will
face reduced risks that “outlier” cases will yield high jury awards, or that
insured defendants would be systematically coerced into settling with
plaintiffs on unfavorable terms. Insurance companies will likely respond
by lowering premiums, thereby reducing the problematic tort tax.
IV. THE TWO DOMINANT FEE-SHIFTING PARADIGMS
A. The American Rule
Over the past two centuries, civil litigation emerged as a popular
method of dispute resolution,21 a trend that American courts nurtured
through their development of the common law.22 In the early twentieth
century, the Supreme Court stressed the importance of preserving access
to courts as an avenue of redress for injured parties who might otherwise
take the law into their own hands: “The right to sue and defend in the
courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right
conservative of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly
government. It is one of the highest and most essential privileges of
citizenship. . . .”23 To guarantee the availability of judicial process to
plaintiffs with limited economic means, nineteenth-century American
judges rejected the fee-shifting jurisprudence of their colonial
predecessors, interpreting state statutes to preclude the recovery of
attorneys’ fees by victorious parties.24 These practices culminated in an
21. One author observes that “[al]though litigation has not routed all other forms of fight, it is
gaining public favor as the legitimate and most effective means of seeking and winning one’s just
desserts.” LIEBERMAN, supra note 1.
22. Legislators and judges in many states remain vigilant in their efforts to preserve the
American Rule. See, e.g., Crowely v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083, 1094-95 (Cal. 1994); In re Estate of
Keeven, 882 P.2d 457, 465 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); Hearity v. Iowa Dist. Court, 440 N.W.2d 860,
863 (Iowa 1989); Goodover v. Lindey’s Inc., 843 P.2d 765, 775-76 (Mont. 1992); Lannon v. Lee
Conner Realty Corp., 385 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Va. 1989).
23. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
24. See Arthur L. Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee
Recovery, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 9, 10.
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“American Rule” of fee-shifting, a term coined by Arthur Goodhart to
refer to the practice of holding each party to a civil litigation responsible
for its own lawyer’s fees, and freeing the losing party from any
obligation to reimburse the legal costs of the winner.25 In the twentieth
century,26 this rule embedded itself in the legal process to such a
significant degree that on several occasions the United States Supreme
Court proclaimed its unwillingness to create common law inroads into
the American Rule in the absence of state or federal legislation.27
1. The policies underlying a “pay your own way” system
While the American Rule is unique among Western legal systems in
dissociating the obligation to pay legal expenses from trial outcomes,28
sound policies underlie the institutional reluctance to transfer
responsibility for attorneys’ fees between litigating parties. Judge
Cardozo and other jurists theorized that unless one party brought or
defended a lawsuit in bad faith, the equities between the litigants would
not be so unbalanced as to justify shifting attorneys’ fees that are
necessarily incident to establishing legal rights. According to Judge
Cardozo,
[s]ome of the losses that are incidental to the establishment of rights
and the redress of wrongs through the processes of courts should be
allowed, as a matter of social engineering, to lie where they fall. Very
likely, heavier burdens should be imposed where there is evidence of
bad faith or mere dogged perversity.29

More pragmatically, the American tort system is designed to serve

25. Arthur Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal
Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651 (1982) [hereinafter
Rowe I].
26. See Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Conundrum, 26 GA. L. REV. 901, 904-05 (1992). See
generally OLSON, supra note 2.
27. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 270 (1975) (“We do
not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the ‘American Rule’ with respect to the allowance of
attorneys’ fees. It has been criticized in recent years, and courts have been urged to find exceptions
to it. . . . But the rule followed in our courts with respect to attorneys’ fees has survived. It is deeply
rooted in our history and in congressional policy; and it is not for us to invade the legislature’s
province by redistributing litigation costs. . . .”).
28. Outside the United States, only Japan follows the American practice of systematically
assigning each party responsibility for its own legal fees for most classes of civil cases. One
significant exception is tort suits, where the defendant is required to pay the legal expenses of a
prevailing plaintiff. See Rowe I, supra note 25, at 651 n.1.
29. Letter from Benjamin N. Cardozo to H.H. Nordlinger, quoted in G. HELLMAN,
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO: AMERICAN JUDGE 150 (1940).
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the dual function of compensating plaintiffs for their individual injuries
and, on a broader scale, to limit the incidence of high-risk behavior.30 To
satisfy both objectives, the legal system must tolerate some fruitless
claims to promote the vigilance of potential tortfeasors engaged in highrisk activities.31 For many plaintiffs, particularly those seeking damages
that are modest relative to their attorney’s fees, the prospect of also
paying their opponent’s legal expenses if they lose creates a significant
disincentive to bringing suit. Under such a regime, where the normative
value of particular legal rights outweighs a plaintiff’s financial interest in
their preservation (such as the right to exclude strangers from one’s
property), such rights might atrophy from lack of enforcement.
Finally, the American Rule has value despite the claims of some
critics that it defeats the tort system’s avowed goal of “making the victim
whole,” or placing a victorious plaintiff in the same financial position
they occupied prior to the tortious event: “Undeniably, the American
Rule’s effect of reducing a successful plaintiff’s recovery by the amount
of his lawyer’s fee conflicts with the make-whole idea underlying much
of the law of remedies.”32 Indeed, conceptualizing the costs of bringing
or defending a lawsuit as a “legal injury” akin to the physical or
emotional injuries resulting from tortious conduct casts doubt on the
wisdom of a fee-shifting rule that permits recovery of one but not the
other. A 1925 report of the Judicial Council of Massachusetts reduced
the argument to a single question: “On what principle of justice can a
plaintiff wrongfully run down on a public highway recover his doctor’s
bill but not his lawyer’s bill?”33
However, the American legal system has never accorded a plaintiff’s
physical injuries and legal fees equivalent status.34 Indeed, “our system
does not regard bringing (or, for that matter, defending) a losing case—
without more—as the infliction of a legal wrong.”35 Precisely why
attorneys’ fees occupy an unequal position relative to other forms of
tortious injury is a matter of speculation. The high value that Americans
attach to litigation—both as a means of deterring injurious behavior and
resolving civil disputes —indicates that citizens may regard litigation
30. See Gregory A. Hicks, Statutory Damage Caps are an Incomplete Reform: A Proposal
for Attorney Fee Shifting in Tort Actions, 49 LA. L. REV. 763, 774-75 (1989).
31. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1831 (1997).
32. Rowe I, supra note 25, at 657.
33. Judicial Council of Massachusetts, First Report, 11 MASS. L.Q. 7, 64 (1925).
34. The United States Supreme Court has observed in the administrative law context that
“[m]ere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable
injury.” Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974).
35. Rowe I, supra note 25, at 659. See Philip J. Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination
of the Indemnity System, 55 IOWA L. REV. 26, 30 (1969).
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expenses as necessarily incident to the exercise of a valuable right, rather
than as a source of additional financial injury. Perhaps Americans view
attorneys’ fees differently due to the inherent avoidability of legal
expenditures. To extend the hypothetical offered by the Judicial Council
of Massachusetts, a plaintiff is powerless to prevent the medical injuries
that result from being run over in the street, but in many cases could limit
or eliminate litigation expenses through non-adversarial strategies such
as settlement. This conception of litigation is consistent with the high
premium that citizens place on the option to litigate but suggests that a
trial with all the bells and whistles should be a last resort for resolving
civil disputes.
One final explanation for the disparate treatment of
physical/emotional injury and attorneys’ fees within the tort system is the
similarity of legal costs to consequential economic losses that are denied
as a matter of policy to tort plaintiffs. As the First Circuit observed in
Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Marau: “[M]any of the ‘financially
injured’ will find it easier than the ‘physically injured’ to arrange for
cheaper, alternative compensation. The typical “financial” plaintiff is
likely to . . . buy [] insurance, and . . . may well be able to arrange for
‘first party’ loss compensation for foreseeable financial harm.”36 While
this theory fails to explain the application of the American Rule in legal
regimes that permit the recovery of pure economic loss, it is worth noting
that legislative exceptions to the American Rule are far more prevalent
outside the tort system.37
2. Drawbacks of the American Rule
Particularly within the last twenty years, the American Rule has been
denounced as inefficient and unfair. Critics assert that parties with only
their own legal expenses to consider are encouraged to engage in
wasteful litigation.38 Congressional opposition to the American Rule
reached a fever pitch in 1994, as the House of Representatives
considered the wholesale adoption of a British-style, “loser pays” feeshifting system as a component of the “Contract with America”
legislative program.39 The Bush Administration’s Council on

36. 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985).
37. See infra Part IV.A.2.
38. Lorraine Wright Feuerstein, Comment, Two-Way Fee Shifting on Summary Judgment or
Dismissal: An Equitable Deterrent to Unmeritorious Lawsuits, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 125, 128 (1995)
(“The American rule provides no deterrent to groundless litigation. In fact it invites spurious
claims.”) (citing further scholarly criticism of the American rule).
39. Thomas D. Rowe, Indemnity or Compensation? The Contract with America, Loser-Pays
Attorney Fee Shifting, and a One-Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 317, 319 (1998) [hereinafter

317]

REVERSE COST-SHIFTING

327

Competitiveness, led by Vice President Dan Quayle, defended the
proposal, arguing that “[b]ecause the losing party will be obligated to pay
the winner’s fees, this approach will encourage litigants to evaluate
carefully the merits of their cases before initiating a frivolous claim or
adopting a spurious defense.”40
But even as the American Rule is impugned for failing to deter nonmeritorious litigation practices, it is simultaneously criticized for overdeterring lawsuits by plaintiffs bringing small claims that are swallowed
by attorneys’ fees: “Even though the American Rule may encourage the
filing of claims that have no basis in law or fact, some legitimate claims
may still remain unredressed when the cost to litigate exceeds the
possible recovery.”41 While in some cases an attorney will represent the
plaintiff on a contingency fee basis, it is unlikely that lawyers will invest
their time in cases with a low potential payoff.
Consequently, individuals are discouraged from using the courts to
vindicate clear legal entitlements in two types of cases. First, injured
plaintiffs are deterred from filing claims when the economic magnitude
of their injury is small relative to their anticipated legal expenses,
particularly when they are the sole victim of the tortfeasor’s conduct. For
example, failure to repay a small debt or to adhere to a contract after the
other party has performed may not give rise to a viable lawsuit. States
typically restrict the jurisdiction of small claims courts to trivial sums,42
leaving a sizable gap between the jurisdictional ceiling of these courts
and the magnitude of financial injury that economically justifies
litigating in a court of general jurisdiction.43 Cases slipping between the
cracks of small claims courts and courts of general jurisdiction might
become cause for alarm if they reflected systematic absorption of injury
damages by victims. However, the sporadic incidence of sharp practices
imposes fairly minor costs due to the small amounts at stake and the
availability of extra-judicial means of inducing compliance (including
threats to reputation, damage to credit history, etc.).
Of greater social concern are cases in which the benefits of litigating
Rowe II].
40. Dan Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 979, 1003
(1992).
41. Feuerstein, supra note 38, at 130-31. See also Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of
Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966).
42. For example, the jurisdictional limit for small claims courts in New York is $3,000, while
small claims courts in Massachusetts only adjudicate claims of $1500 or less. See Gerald Lebovits,
Special Procedures Apply to Enforcing Judgments in Small Claims Courts, 71 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28
(1999) (citing Small Claims §§ 1813(a) – 1813–A(a)); Douglas L. Fox, Damages in Massachusetts
Litigation, 2 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN DAMAGES CASES § 2.16 (2003).
43. See Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical
Analysis of the Small Claims Court Examined, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 315, 319, 326 (2003).
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far outweigh the costs but where litigation is still unattractive because the
benefits take the form of a public good. This class of lawsuits can be
further sub-divided into two categories. First, a defendant may inflict an
injury diffused over a sufficiently large group of potential plaintiffs such
that it is not in the interest of any single plaintiff to assume the financial
burden of initiating legal action. Consider a nuisance case in which
emissions from a factory degrade the air quality for neighboring
residents.44 The residents may possess an entitlement to clean air, but the
transaction costs of overcoming collection action problems to institute
legal proceedings may preclude enforcement of this entitlement. Critics
of the American Rule observe that a fee-shifting rule requiring the
defendant to reimburse the legal costs of a victorious plaintiff would
dramatically reduce the financial obstacles to filing suit.45 Indeed,
plaintiffs with an unambiguous legal entitlement are attractive candidates
for contingency fee arrangements.46
The second sub-category of high-impact/small-recovery cases are
those in which bringing suit is financially risky because liability can only
be established through a change in the existing law. Professor Frank
Cross observes that:
A fundamental outcome of litigation, and perhaps its greatest benefit to
society, is producing precedents that define the law, affect subsequent
decisions, and influence private economic behavior. However, such
precedents are in many respects externalities or public goods because
the litigants themselves cannot capture much of the benefit associated
with a precedent that their case creates.47

Concededly, a potential plaintiff is more likely to fight for a change
in the law as a “private attorney general” outside the tort system. For
44. A. M. POLINKSY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 15 (2d ed. 1989); Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
45. Martha Pacold, Comment, Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions Governed by Fee-Shifting
Statutes, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1007 (2001) (discussing the fee-shifting methods and the
calculations of attorneys’ fees where the loser must pay the prevailing party).
46. Fee-shifting schemes purporting to encourage efficient levels of litigation cannot rely on
class litigation to overcome the public goods dilemma, but must create incentives for plaintiffs to sue
in their individual capacity. The efficacy of class litigation is not only restrained by formidable
procedural obstacles to certifying a class, see, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) & (b) ((detailing the
manifold requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy to maintain a class action lawsuit), but in many
cases “the cost of organizing the class and of overcoming free-rider problems may well [be] too high
for the class to form and litigate.”); Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 205, 220 (1982).
47. Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2000); see
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235 (1979).
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example, the predominantly statute-based realms of civil rights, labor,
tax, and regulatory behavior are prime forums for plaintiffs with proper
financial incentive to fight stagnation in the law by litigating disputes
that reveal pathologies in the status quo understanding of particular
statutes. While the tort system may be older and less dynamic than
blossoming areas of statutory law, it is also more susceptible to
ossification and, therefore, in need of occasional shocks from
enterprising plaintiffs. For example, Judge Cardozo’s opinion in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.48 revolutionized the field of products
liability by eliminating the requirement of privity between the injured
party and the manufacturer. Advocates of fee-shifting would denounce
the American Rule by emphasizing the ex ante unattractiveness of
MacPherson’s position. Not only did he assume substantial financial risk
by bringing suit as a party with no privity to the manufacturer, but he
must also have known that he could only prevail by accomplishing a
change in the law at the end of a costly appeals process.49
While MacPherson and other groundbreaking tort cases50 illustrate
that the American Rule does not systematically chill landmark tort
litigation, the costs of undertaking trials and appeals are higher today
than they were when such cases as MacPherson and Escola were
litigated.51 Presuming that the social benefits of instigating shocks to the
tort system generally outweigh the costs to the individual litigant,52 the
American Rule’s failure to reward risk-taking plaintiffs inflicts costs on
society. These consequences are exacerbated in the tort system, where
the private nature of injuries deters special interests and other
organizational plaintiffs from subsidizing the costs of tort lawsuits in the
public interest.
A final disadvantage of the American Rule is its unequal treatment of
48. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
49. While some commentators invoke “repeat player” theories to explain litigation behavior
that appears irrational within the context of a single case, plaintiffs like MacPherson (or even their
attorneys) are unlikely repeat players because they have little to gain in future litigation. Repeat
players are predominantly tort defendants, who may act irrationally in a small cluster of cases in
order to establish favorable precedent that pre-empts future lawsuits at their expense. See Cross,
supra note 47, at 9.
50. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab, 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975) (rejecting the existing theory of
contributory negligence and adopting a pure comparative negligence standard); Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (advocating for a rule of strict
liability for manufacturers to replace California’s negligence-based regime).
51. See, e.g., Meade W. Mitchell, Discovery Abuse and a Proposed Reform: Mandatory
Disclosure, 62 Miss. L. J. 743, 750 (1993) (observing that modern discovery practices have
dramatically increased the costs of litigation).
52. This may not always be the case. In Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), the
California Supreme Court controversially held that a bystander who witnesses a close relative being
injured can recover damages for emotional distress. Yet the vague standard established in Dillon was
subsequently rejected by most other states. See Feuerstein, supra note 38, at 162.
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cases with similar expected values but different relative strengths. If a
case is divided into two primary components—liability and damages—
the expected value of the case is equal to the product of (1) the
probability of proving liability (or the percentage of liability in a pure
comparative fault regime), and (2) the reasonably calculated damages.53
From an efficiency standpoint, cases with a comparable expected value
should yield similar compensation for plaintiffs. Consider the following
two cases: (1) A plaintiff claims he suffered whiplash from an
automobile accident in which the defendant was clearly at fault; (2) a
plaintiff claims that she fell out of bed and broke her legs because her
doctor administered an excessive dose of antibiotic.54
In the first instance, the liability component of the case is strong, but
damages are more uncertain. Conversely, liability is more difficult to
prove in the second case, but the damages are easily ascertainable.
Because the American Rule does not penalize parties who litigate to the
hilt, it encourages plaintiffs who can overcome summary judgment to
argue exhaustively (at significant expense to both parties) the flimsier
damages claim once they have reached the jury. By contrast, plaintiffs
with a concrete damages claim but a weaker case for liability is unlikely
to obtain a settlement offer that approximates their damages since the
defendants will often channel their resources into a fight for dismissal at
the summary judgment stage. This horizontal inequality between cases
with similar expected values illustrates the inefficiency that plagues the
tort system under the American Rule. In a world without transaction
costs, a defendant would expend scarce financial resources to offer
partial compensation to “weak-liability plaintiffs” (appropriately
discounted to reflect uncertain liability). “Strong-liability plaintiffs”
would similarly accept an offer of compensation that accurately reflects
their injuries, without expending resources to finance a roll of the dice
with a jury.
B. The British Rule
Proposals to modify the American Rule invariably incorporate
elements of the “British” or “loser pays” rule. In its purest form, the
British Rule requires the losing party in a civil litigation to pay the
winning party’s attorney’s fees.55 This species of attorney-fee

53. See Stephen J. Spurr & Walter O. Simmons, Medical Malpractice in Michigan: 21 An
Economic Analysis, J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 315, 333 (1996).
54. See Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968).
55. Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 44 (1984).
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reimbursement is known as “two-way” fee-shifting because costs can
flow either from the defendant to the plaintiff or vice versa depending on
the outcome of the case.56 The pillar of the British Rule is the shift of
attorneys’ fees under a system of “general indemnification.”57
Indemnification is the equivalent of strict or no-fault liability in tort; the
party adjudged to have lost the case is responsible for the winner’s
attorney’s fees regardless of the margin of victory or the objective merit
of the loser’s case.58
While the British Rule offers certain efficiency advantages,59 the rule
in its unadulterated state is incompatible with the American conception
of litigation as an important correlate of justice. Citizens in the United
States place a high premium on the option to go to court, and the
deterrent effect of the British Rule undoubtedly closes the courthouse
doors to many low-income parties. Some laud the British Rule as a
corrective mechanism for the American Rule’s over-deterrence of small
claims in which the operative legal rule substantially favors the potential
plaintiff.60 However, while the British Rule might discourage frivolous
litigation when legal standards are clear, tort claims are inherently factsensitive and rarely susceptible to predictable outcomes under clear
unambiguous legal rules.61 As soon as legal uncertainty is introduced into
a dispute, parties who are risk-averse or have shallow pockets may be
hesitant to expose themselves to substantial fee-shifts at the close of
litigation. The British Rule is particularly troubling because it imposes
this chilling effect disproportionately on private litigants opposing
individually wealthy or commercial defendants who rapidly accumulate
legal expenses.62
Finally, a fee-shifting rule predicated on no-fault indemnification has
a punitive ring that is inconsistent with the exalted status of litigation in
American society. Professor Thomas Rowe remarks that “[p]ractices in
this country . . . leave room for the feeling that losers will often not have
been unreasonable or unjustified in insisting on litigation.”63 Judge

56. Robin Stanley, Note, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources: To the Prevailing Party Goes the Spoils . . . and the
Attorney’s Fees!, 36 AKRON L. REV. 363, 368 & n.30 (2003).
57. Rowe I, supra note 25, at 655.
58. See Rowe II, supra note 39, at 321-22.
59. See John J. Donohue III, Opting For the British Rule, Or If Posner And Shavell Can’t
Remember The Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1118 (1991).
60. See id.
61. See Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and the Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
427, 437-38 (1995) (hereinafter Hylton II).
62. See Gregory E. Maggs & Michael D. Weiss, Progress on Attorney’s Fees: Expanding the
“Loser Pays” Rule In Texas, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1915, 1927 (1994).
63. Rowe I, supra note 25, at 655-56.
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Cardozo offered this first-hand perspective: “I have seen enough of the
judicial process to know its imperfections. I would not lay too heavy a
burden upon the unsuccessful litigant.”64
V. ECHOES OF THE BRITISH RULE IN AMERICAN REFORM
A. State and Federal Modification of the American Rule
While a wholesale adoption of the British Rule is infeasible for the
American judicial process, Congress and various states have morphed the
American and British Rules into hybrid fee-shifting schemes for use in
certain state and federal lawsuits.65 Before analyzing these schemes,
recall that the two primary criticisms of the American Rule are its underdeterrence of frivolous litigation tactics and its over-deterrence of
plaintiffs with small but meritorious claims.66 Generally, critics who are
disillusioned by wasteful litigation will prefer one-way fee-shifting rules
that transfer costs only from plaintiffs to prevailing defendants. On the
other hand, those predominantly concerned about the prospects of smallclaim plaintiffs advocate for statutory provisions that shift fees in the
opposite direction.
The process of translating these policy objectives into concrete feeshifting rules occurs on parallel tracks in Congress and the state
legislatures. However, commentators routinely overlook the divergent
objectives of federal fee-shifting rules and analogous state provisions.
Legislators in Washington fashion fee-shifting provisions to encourage
plaintiffs to act as private attorneys general when enforcement of the
rights in question serves the public interest.67 Federal fee-shifting
provisions are accordingly designed to discourage litigation that impedes
the exercise of these statutory rights.68 Conversely, state-conceived feeshifting rules are applied to legal subject matter that governs more
individualized disputes in such common law realms as contract, tort, and
64. Cardozo quoted in HELLMAN, supra note 29.
65. By 1983, Congress had passed over two hundred federal statutes containing fee-shifting
provisions into law. Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Carns, Alaska’s English Rule: Attorney’s Fee
Shifting in Civil Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33, 37(1996) (citing 3 Mary Francis Derfner & Arthur
D. Wolf, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, table of statutes (1983)). Texas and California have
legislated significant modifications to the American Rule for particular types of cases, while Alaska
features a blanket fee-shifting scheme that more closely resembles the British rule than the American
Rule. Feuerstein, supra note 38, at 133.
66. See supra Part IV.A.2.
67. See Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 635-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Marisa L. Ugalde, The Future of
Environmental Citizen Suits After Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health & Human Services, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 589, 594-95 (2002).
68. See Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 65, at 37.
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property.
As a policy tool designed to promote efficiency, fee-shifting rules
mold to a particular sovereign’s conception of optimality. In the federal
system, efficiency is reached at the point where the public interest is
maximized.69 In certain statutory areas where fee-shifting provisions are
common, including environmental law, consumer protection, and civil
rights, the public interest may be measured in units of preservation,
safety, and personal dignity, rather than dollars and cents.70 Thus,
reaching the efficient level of litigation from a public interest perspective
is not accomplished by seeking to enforce legal rights at the lowest cost,
but by gradually adding flesh to the bones of statutory language through
repeated legal challenges.
In the state tort system, however, the salient objective is not to
determine the scope of newly created rights, but to apply wellestablished legal rules to particular, often challenging, factual
scenarios.71 In this Coasean paradigm,72 litigation is a transaction cost of
enforcing compliance with legal rules. Because an excessive number of
lawsuits artificially distorts the price of engaging in particular behavior,73
the efficient level of tort litigation is the minimal level of litigation
necessary to ensure full compliance with legal rules.
Given the dissimilar goals of federal and state fee-shifting rules, one
would expect the malleable American and British rules to be sculpted
differently by federal and state legislators. Specifically, a fee-shifting
rule tailored for the tort system would impose financial penalties for
bringing or defending non-meritorious claims and encourage parties to
settle immediately after ascertaining the extent of the defendant’s
liability under the relevant legal rules. However, a fee-shifting provision
in a federal statutory scheme might provide plaintiffs with incentives to

69. See Joseph K. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of
Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 180-201 (2004) (outlining general goals of the tort system).
70. See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The Supreme Court,
Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV. 291, 309 (1990) (in § II.B.3, discussing the stated
legislative goals of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976).
71. See Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 518-19 (2002).
72. See generally, Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.1, 1-44
(1960).
73. See Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th Cong.
§ 2(a)(4) (1996) (vetoed) (observing that the consequence of excessive and unpredictable damage
awards is that “consumers have been adversely affected through the withdrawal of products,
producers, services, and service providers from the marketplace”); Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d
470, 479 (Cal. 1988) (blaming the tort system for contributing to sharp increases in the price of
Bendectin and DTP vaccine); HUBER, supra note 15, at 155-61 (asserting that strict products liability
has caused stagnation in research and development in the drug, contraceptive, chemical, small
aircraft, automotive, and medical industries).
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litigate for the purpose of compiling a comprehensive record that enables
judges to formulate reasoned constructions of the law. As discussed
below, the fee-shifting rules emerging in both systems are strikingly
similar, raising the possibility that state-led reforms of the American
Rule sacrifice efficiency by furnishing plaintiffs with incentives to
litigate that are inappropriate in tort.
B. The Result of State and Federal Fee-Shifting Experimentation: Broad
Judicial Discretion Under a Pro-Prevailing Plaintiff Regime
On the federal level, Congress inserts boilerplate fee-shifting
language into select statutes, reflecting a one-dimensional purpose of
removing obstacles for potential plaintiffs that does not vary with the
subject matter of the statutory rights created. For example, in 1974
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), a law designed to regulate the private employee benefit system
and, specifically, to ensure that workers received the benefits promised to
them by their employers.74 The statute grants courts the power to award
attorneys’ fees through language that is “broad and unconstrained”:75
“[t]he court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and
costs of action to either party.”76 In 1976, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act,77 which uses nearly identical
language in authorizing judges to shift fees in federal civil rights actions:
“The court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”78 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has encouraged lower courts to develop federal common law to
guide judges applying these uniform fee-shifting provisions, observing
that the “fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is a ‘strong indication’
that they are to be interpreted alike.”79
Fee-shifting statutes enacted in states such as Alaska, California, and
Texas closely track their federal analogues. For instance, the Alaska
Code of Civil Procedure grants judges broad discretion to award fees to
victorious litigants: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, the

74. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). See BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON ERISA FIDUCIARY
DUTIES 5 (BNA 3d ed. 1989).
75. Da-Wai Hu, Comment, Running the Caucus-Race: Prevailing Parties and Fee Shifting
under ERISA, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 217, 220 (2000).
76. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1994)).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
78. Id.
79. Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n.2 (1989); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983) (“The standards set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all
cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a ‘prevailing party.’”).
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supreme court [of Alaska] shall determine by rule or order what costs, if
any, including attorney fees, shall be allowed the prevailing party in any
case.”80 Unlike Alaska, California has no blanket fee-shifting provision
that applies to all civil actions brought in state court but enforces feeshifting rules for specific types of controversies. In rare categories of
cases, including dog-breeding disputes81 and breaches of contract for
swimming pool construction,82 California law automatically requires the
losing party to compensate the victor for her attorney’s fees. However,
the majority of California’s fee-shifting rules grant broad discretion to
trial judges.83 Ironically, Texas’s fee-shifting rules, which most closely
approximate the efficiency ideal articulated above, exclude state tort
claims from their reach.84 Nonetheless, by mandating fee-shifting in such
areas as landlord-tenant disputes,85 distribution of alcoholic beverages,86
and city building ordinances,87 these Texas statutes and the small
minority of California laws that eliminate discretion in fee-shifting
provide an important model for tort reformists.
The fee-shifting models adopted in the states contain three flaws that
undermine their fairness and efficiency: (1) an implicit preference for
prevailing plaintiffs over prevailing defendants, (2) broad grants of feeshifting discretion to trial judges that result in unpredictable outcomes
and collateral litigation, and (3) a tendency to improperly influence the
primary behavior of future litigants.
1. Inefficiency resulting from the judicial preference for awarding fees
to prevailing plaintiffs
Although the neutral language of two-way fee-shifting provisions
implies that prevailing plaintiffs and defendants are equally entitled to
attorneys’ fees, judges routinely interpret both state and federal feeshifting rules as expressing a strong preference for prevailing plaintiffs.
One commentator examining the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards
Act observed that “despite the statutory phrases ‘in its discretion’ and
‘prevailing party,’ . . . fees are normally awarded only to prevailing
plaintiffs. The effect of [section] 1988 is that prevailing plaintiffs almost
80. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(a)(1) (1959).
81. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25989.555 (West Supp. 1995).
82. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7168 (West Supp. 1995).
83. See RICHARD M. PEARL, CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS § 2.4 (Christopher D.
Dworin ed., 2d ed. 1994).
84. See generally Maggs & Weiss, supra note 62.
85. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.0062 (West Supp. 1995).
86. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 102.79 (West Supp. 1995).
87. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 214.0015 (West Supp. 1995).
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always recover their fees whereas prevailing defendants can recover fees
only in exceptional circumstances.”88 State judges are as susceptible to
mimicking federal practices as their legislative counterparts. In
California, “[e]ven when a statute’s language is discretionary and allows
for recovery by either party, courts interpret it as presumptively requiring
awards to plaintiffs and disallowing fee-shifting to defendants.”89 In
practice, this judicial doctrine of plaintiff preference precludes victorious
defendants from recovering their attorney’s fees unless the plaintiff’s suit
is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.”90 Thus, losing
defendants are held to a British-style strict liability standard mitigated
slightly by the court’s equitable powers, while defeated plaintiffs only
reimburse fees under fault-based, negligence principles.
Construing these statutes as shifting fees to prevailing defendants
under negligence-based theories is erroneous as a matter of statutory
construction. Federal law already imposes a negligence-based regime
under which courts may shift fees to parties victimized by wasteful
litigation practices: “Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings
in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”91 Moreover, at least
thirty-four states have adopted provisions similar to Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that authorize courts to sanction parties
engaging in non-meritorious litigation practices by shifting attorneys’
fees.92 These statutes are rendered superfluous when judges interpret
state fee-shifting laws to transfer attorneys’ fees to defendants under
fault-based schemes oriented around buzzwords (“unreasonable,”
“frivolous,” “vexatious,” “without foundation”) already operative under
existing law.
More significantly, fee-shifting rules skewed toward prevailing
plaintiffs induce inefficiency and unfairness into the tort system. Proprevailing plaintiff rules undermine the leverage of defendants in
settlement negotiations, since the plaintiffs’ bar, cognizant of the
expansive bounds prescribed by such terms as “unreasonable” and
88. Joel H. Trotter, The Catalyst Theory of Civil Rights Fee Shifting After Farrar v. Hobby,
80 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1432-33 (1994).
89. PEARL, supra note 83, at § 2.7; see Sokolow v. County of San Mateo, 261 Cal. Rptr. 520,
528 (Ct. App. 1989).
90. Id.; see also PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: SECTION
1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 572 (2d ed. 1994) (observing that under the Civil Rights Attorney’s
Fees Awards Act, plaintiffs are only obliged to reimburse the prevailing defendant’s attorney’s fees
if the litigation is unreasonable, frivolous, groundless, or vexatious).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
92. Gerald F. Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal and State Court: an Empirical, Comparative
Study, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 313, 315 (1992); see FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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“frivolous,” can temper their litigation strategies so as never to do worse
than the American Rule regardless of outcome. Defendants, on the other
hand, must prevail at trial to avoid subsidizing the as-yet-unknown
attorney’s fees of their opponent.93 Without equivalent prospects of fee
reimbursement, defendants are under more pressure to settle than their
plaintiff-opponents. Consequently, plaintiffs systematically capture a
“settlement surplus,”94 or premium over and above reasonable
compensation for injury that reflects the disproportionate risks to the
defendant of litigating.
From an efficiency perspective, the judiciary’s zeal to remove
financial obstacles for plaintiffs also imposes social costs on non-parties
whose interests are threatened by raising the costs of defendants’
conduct. If widget manufacturers consistently pay higher settlements to
injured plaintiffs and/or are obligated to assume disproportionate feeshifting risk for litigated disputes, they will raise the price of widgets to
reflect these increased costs. Perhaps the price of widgets was artificially
low under the American Rule due to the over-deterrence of small claims;
nonetheless, it is difficult to claim that a rule skewed towards proprevailing plaintiffs transmits more accurate signals to producers and
consumers than an evenly administered two-way rule that binds each
party equally to the merits of their case.
2. Inefficiency resulting from broad statutory discretion granted to the
judges who administer hybrid fee-shifting rules
The vast majority of state fee-shifting statutes do not mandate the
automatic transfer of attorneys’ fees after the trial is concluded but grant
broad discretion to judges to determine when and to what degree the
losing party should reimburse the winner for his attorney’s fees.95 In the
federal system, courts of appeals have developed complex multi-factor
balancing tests to assess the propriety of fee shifts under the
circumstances of the particular case. The first of these tests emerged
from the Tenth Circuit,96 which proposed the following five factors for
courts to consider: (1) the degree of the offending parties’ culpability or

93. While most fee-shifting statutes limit the victor’s recovery to “reasonable attorney’s
fees,” such unknown variables as the nature of discovery, the length of trial, the number of
witnesses, and the use of experts can cause significant fluctuations in the amount of attorneys’ fees
that a judge would deem “reasonable.” Moreover, defendants are rarely in a position to predict how a
judge will perceive the equities of a particular case and allocate fees correspondingly.
94. See Hylton I, supra note 7, at 1084-85.
95. See Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a
Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 402 (1990).
96. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 464-65 (10th Cir. 1978).
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bad faith, (2) the ability of the parties to personally satisfy an award of
attorney’s fees, (3) whether or not an award of attorneys’ fees against the
offending parties would deter other persons acting under similar
circumstances, (4) the amount of benefit conferred on non-parties to the
litigation, and (5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.97 The
Seventh Circuit attempted to simplify the fee-shifting calculus98 by
establishing a presumption that courts should shift fees to the prevailing
party unless (1) the losing party argued a non-frivolous position with a
“solid basis,” or (2) special circumstances warranted against awarding
fees for equitable reasons.99
These tests illustrate the amorphous process of administering
identically worded state fee-shifting provisions and raise the specter of
collateral litigation, or costly legal activity peripheral to the primary
dispute that often occurs when fee-shifting rules are applied. Efficiency
mavens may accept fee-shifting as an antidote to the necessary evil of
litigation, but fee-shifting rules that themselves spawn litigation are
unforgivable. Yet rules that fail to shift fees automatically motivate
parties to brief and argue the fee-shifting question ad nauseum given the
high financial stakes.
Another oft-litigated issue implicates the meaning of the phrase
“prevailing party” commonly found in state and federal fee-shifting
statutes. For example, does a litigant “prevail” if they win but receive
only nominal damages?100 Should plaintiffs be entitled to attorney’s fees
if the defendant grants the plaintiff a substantial measure of the relief
requested through a settlement? Advocates of “catalyst theory” argue
that a plaintiff has “prevailed” within the meaning of the relevant statute
if the defendant agrees to alter its controversial conduct as a result of the
litigation,101 while critics point out that defendants often settle with
plaintiffs for reasons having nothing to do with the merits of the
plaintiff’s complaint.102 The important lesson for tort reformists is that
the collateral litigation spurred by broad delegations of discretion to trial
judges and the uncertainty surrounding the “prevailing party” language

97. Id. at 465.
98. Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1984).
99. Id. at 830.
100. See, e.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992) (ruling that a civil rights plaintiff
who sued for $17 million but only received nominal damages of one dollar was not entitled to
attorney’s fees: “to qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some
relief on the merits of his claim”).
101. Adam Babich, Fee Shifting after Buckhannon, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10137 (2002).
102. See Hooper v. Demco, Inc., 37 F.3d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 1994) (“A suit may be groundless,
and settled for its nuisance value, or settled by a party for wholly gratuitous reasons, thus not
justifying an award of attorney’s fees.”).
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results in large inefficiencies.103
3. Inefficiency resulting from the failure of hybrid fee-shifting provisions
to encourage compliance with legal rules
An ideal fee-shifting rule would not only function efficiently after
the fact, when a plaintiff alleges injury, but also work backwards to
increase incentives for actors to conform their primary behavior to
existing legal rules.104 A fee-shifting rule with automatic application that
treats plaintiffs and defendants identically would have the collateral
benefit of encouraging compliance with legal rules by making litigation
an equally unattractive fall-back position for all potential parties. To
illustrate, a fee-shifting statute that imposes disproportionate litigation
costs on plaintiffs is inefficient because it emboldens defendants to
violate legal rules, secure in the knowledge that financial obstacles will
compel their victims to suffer silently out of court.105 Conversely, the
current pro-prevailing plaintiff standard that insures the fees of victorious
plaintiffs and limits their exposure in defeat may encourage defendants to
over-invest in efforts to adhere to legal rules,106 while simultaneously
encouraging plaintiffs to engage in morally hazardous behavior.107
Finally, a fee-shifting rule applied unpredictably will likely have
randomized effects that impose cumulative inefficiencies; certain
individuals or commercial parties may conduct themselves with
excessive caution while others engage in careless activity.
Ultimately, fee-shifting rules should function as predictably and
equitably as the legal rules under which they operate. Discrepancies in
the clarity of fee-shifting rules and legal rules in tort, while frustrating,
are understandable in light of their disparate ages and unequal exposure
to iterative development. Legal rules inherently defy automatic
application, but require common law refinement to guide the exercise of
judicial discretion. Hence, one can posit the presence of certain legal

103. See Nelken, supra note 95, at 391-92 (“[S]ome judges question whether the frivolous
cases Rule 11 keeps out of court might not be less of a burden on the system than the litigation the
rule generates over sanctions.”).
104. See Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 808 (1990) (“[J]udges,
lawyers, and legal scholars have argued that fear of liability will compel potential tortfeasors to
engage in a cost-benefit analysis, taking just those safety precautions that cost less than the accidents
they prevent.”).
105. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American
Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2002)
(discussing how legislative immunity leads to dangerous behavior).
106. See Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2075
(1993) (§ II, Costs of One-way Fee Shifting).
107. Id.
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uncertainties while the tort regime endured its growing pains. However,
the narrow substantive scope and conceptual simplicity of fee-shifting
rules suggest an alternative to the inevitable period of uncertainty under a
new fee-shifting regime. State legislators can promulgate fee-shifting
rules that are not beholden to an act of judicial discretion, but
presumptively operate in the absence of extenuating circumstances.
On a normative level, clear legal rules permit people to coordinate
their behavior to maximize joint utility. Guido Calabresi observes “as
long as individuals are adequately informed about the alternatives and as
long as the cost to society of giving them what they want is reflected in
the cost to the individual, the individual can decide better than anyone
else what he wants.”108 Until fee-shifting rules attain the same level of
refinement as the tort rules that they enforce, civil parties will be unable
to coordinate their behavior so as to minimize both their individual
transaction costs and the broader social costs resulting from litigation.
VI. REVERSE-COST SHIFTING (RCS)
A. Introduction to RCS
The RCS Rule is conceptually simple: “In civil actions, the losing
side pays a multiple of its own costs to the court.”109 Legislators would
fix this multiple, or “compensation factor,” by statute in each
jurisdiction.110 If, for example, the multiple is fixed at 1, a plaintiff who
expends $5,000 on a lawsuit and loses would be required to pay an
additional $5,000 to the court. Ephraim Fischbach and William
McLauchlan characterize this rule as reverse-cost shifting “since the
penalty levied against the losing side is determined by the expenditures
of the losing side, rather than by the expenses of the winning side as
under the [British] Rule.”111
The optimality of the RCS rule derives from its automatic
application and strong settlement incentives that work in tandem to
minimize the transaction costs arising from tort litigation. Procedurally,
RCS corrects for the inefficiencies of the pro-prevailing plaintiff regime
by (1) automatically levying a penalty on the losing party, and (2) fixing
the size of the penalty through a rigid formula that resists judicial
variance or modification. 112 Moreover, RCS only exposes litigants to a
108. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 70 (1970).
109. Fischbach & McLauchlan, supra note 11, at 39.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 42-44. For legal issues of first impression, or litigation in which the benefits
take the form of a public good, the RCS rule might permit judges to waive the fee shift. However,
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fee-shift as a function of their own knowable legal costs and intentionally
divorces the penalty from their opponents’ unknowable expenditures.
This “reverse-cost” element of the rule, initially introduced in a feeshifting proposal crafted by the President’s Council on Competitiveness
(“PCC”),113 allows plaintiffs and defendants to accurately project their
fee-shifting exposure. In the end, this feature not only minimizes
transaction costs arising from imperfect information during the litigation
process, but also “mitigate[s] the concern that a wealthy litigant could
extort submission from an opponent by threatening to conduct a very
costly legal campaign.”114
Substantively, the RCS rule facilitates litigation efficiency by closely
tethering the parties to the merits of their case and increasing the
incentives for parties to settle as trial expenses accumulate. Under RCS,
a plaintiff who calculates his probability of victory to be below fifty
percent at any point before or during the trial has strong incentives to
either settle or forego a lawsuit entirely. Similarly, a defendant facing a
high probability of defeat should offer to settle rather than increase his
fee-shifting exposure by continuing to litigate. Thus, unlike the two
paradigmatic rules and the pro-prevailing plaintiff scheme, RCS compels
parties to constantly reevaluate the status of their case as the litigation
continues and RCS exposure increases.115
In close cases, the parties’ conception of a “fair” settlement figure
will ideally converge as a function of time and, ultimately, intersect at a
damages figure that restores the plaintiff as nearly as possible to his preinjury position.116 Plaintiffs also have substantial disincentives to litigate
cases where the probability of success is low and RCS exposure is
correspondingly high. The RCS rule can also be tweaked to promote
efficient outcomes even when the plaintiff is almost certain to prevail
and, therefore, unwilling to engage in settlement discussions. To increase
defendants’ leverage under these circumstances, the rule may be
note that because the RCS Rule transfers fees to the court rather than the opposing party, an actual or
anticipated waiver of the fee should not induce inefficient behavior by the opposing party, who does
not stand to personally gain or lose by such a decision.
113. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
IN AMERICA 24-25 (1991).
114. Bradley L. Smith, Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their
Impact on Settlement Incentives, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2154, 2156 (1992).
115. The American Rule and the British Rule do not directly penalize parties as a function of
their own litigation expenditures. Therefore, when the case commences parties will make a one-time
determination of the probability of overcoming a summary judgment motion (under the American
Rule) or prevailing in front of the jury (under the British Rule). A party that decides not to settle
before the suit commences has little incentive under these fee-shifting rules to change their mind
once the litigation begins.
116. See Elissa M. Meth, Note, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in
Domestic and International Disputes, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 383, 384 (1999).

342

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 19

modified to impose an RCS penalty on the plaintiff (and absolve the
defendant of any RCS fee shift) if the jury verdict is less than the
defendant’s final settlement offer.
The RCS rule also has the potential to single-handedly alleviate one
of the more pernicious ills afflicting corporate America—the profligacy
of class action lawsuits. Recent amendments to Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, along with Congress’s enactment in February
2005 of the Class Action Fairness Act,117 were motivated, at least in part,
by the complaint of commercial defendants that the certification of a
class action lawsuit empowered plaintiffs to extract unduly favorable
settlements from defendants unwilling to risk a massive classwide
damages verdict at trial.118 Thus, even parties defending against nonmeritorious claims are often coerced into settling to avoid the disastrous,
if unlikely, scenario that the jury would find for the plaintiff.119
Once a class is certified, it is almost never economically feasible for
the defendant to proceed to trial.120 Even so, the RCS rule could
substantially level the playing field for defendants attempting to settle
certified class actions by making the threat to go to trial a meaningful
stick in settlement negotiations. Depending on the precise size of the
class and the nature of the issues certified for class treatment, the cost of
actually litigating a class action lawsuit can be astronomical, inducing a
proportionally precipitous rise in the plaintiffs’ RCS penalty if they
refuse to settle on appropriate terms and then lose at trial.
As these examples illustrate, the elegance of the RCS rule derives
not only from its underlying incentive structure, but also from its
versatility as a template for tort reform. RCS is an amalgam of
components—including inter alia the compensation factor, timing of
penalty, and the legal significance of settlement offers—that lend
themselves to legislative fine-tuning in response to litigation trends and
further empirical study. If, for example, policymakers conclude that
social efficiency gains from reduced “tort taxes” accrue from all pre-

117. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
118. See ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 2000) (“An order granting
certification . . . may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action
and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.”) (citing Advisory Committee Note, FED. R. CIV. P.
23(f)).
119. See Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 2000)
(observing the need for interlocutory appeals of orders certifying a class to provide a “mechanism
through which appellate courts, in the interests of fairness, can restore equilibrium when a doubtful
class certification ruling would virtually compel a party to abandon a potentially meritorious claim
or defense before trial.”). Judge Friendly has referred to settlements induced by a small probability
of an immense judgment in a class action “blackmail settlements.” HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973).
120. See Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995).
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verdict settlements, they may wish to absolve parties of an RCS penalty
no matter when they settle. If legislators target efficiency losses from the
litigation process itself as an important goal of reform, they may opt for
an RCS rule that imposes a reduced penalty if the parties eschew a pretrial settlement but ultimately resolve the case before the jury announces
its verdict. So long as any variations are established by statute and
applied automatically by courts, legislative refinement of the RCS rule
will potentially confer substantial advantages over the more rigid
American Rule and existing hybrids.
The RCS rule offers important ancillary benefits by shifting the
loser’s costs to the court rather than the opposing party.121 Shifting fees
to the court as opposed to the winner ensures that the social efficiency
gains from these transfers are not eroded by the sub-optimal primary
behavior of parties expecting an attorney-fee windfall at trial. The courtshifting requirement also reduces the magnitude of “psychic costs” that
motivate parties to increase their own litigation expenses irrationally to
avoid conferring a financial benefit on their opponent.122 Because
litigation often incites animus in the emotionally charged realm of tort, a
rule that shifts fees to a neutral party is most likely to encourage efficient
behavior. Shifting fees to the court is also attractive insofar as it allocates
financial responsibility for operating the civil justice system to the
litigants who use it, and not to the taxpayers at large. Hence, it eliminates
the taxpayers’ “public subsidization” of courts that artificially suppresses
the cost to parties of engaging the judicial process.123
Finally, by imposing financial risk on parties who bring suit, the
RCS rule indirectly mitigates the ills of contingency fee arrangements,124
avoiding any need to confront this popular institution directly.125 Under
RCS, a lawyer’s investment in his client’s case is no longer confined to
his own time and resources but incorporates the risk of a financial
penalty at the close of litigation. Fischbach and McLauchlin observe that
“[s]ince an attorney may become responsible for his client’s penalty
under the RCS rule, one effect of this rule is to bundle the interests of
121. Fischbach & McLauchlan, supra note 11, at 41.
122. See Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59,
78 (1997).
123. See Stephen J. Choi, The Problem With Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1233, 1239 n.40 (2003) (noting that “[p]arties who choose to continue through the
courts (at least in the [American system]) are subsidized to the extent they do not bear the full cost of
operating the judicial system (including the salary of judges, among others)”).
124. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 567-74 (4th ed. 1992)
(observing that contingency fee arrangements are criticized for encouraging non-meritorious
litigation).
125. See Pfennigstorf, supra note 55 (discussing attorney practices in Europe that circumvent
legal and ethical prohibitions on contingency fee arrangements).
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attorneys and clients together.”126 Thus, the same disincentives to litigate
imposed on parties are transferred to attorneys working under a
contingency fee arrangement. Consequently, attorneys are likely to be
more discriminating in the cases they accept on a contingency fee basis
and may be particularly reluctant to assume the personal economic risk
of litigating a frivolous or nuisance lawsuit on behalf of a non-paying
client. To the extent that the plaintiff personally assumes responsibility
for paying the RCS penalty, the rule will stimulate price competition
among attorneys as clients seek to minimize their RCS exposure by
finding attorneys who can limit litigation expenses. Thus, the RCS rule
transforms the institution of contingency fee arrangements—historically
criticized for encouraging attorney overreaching and litigation excess—
into a compelling incentive for lawyers to practice frugally.
The RCS rule is also designed to encourage fair and rapid
settlement.127 However, scholars do not unanimously agree that the legal
system is well served by rules that deter parties from litigating.128 Critics
of fee-shifting rules that encourage settlement claim that the legal system
is robbed of opportunities to develop precedent, a trend that induces
stagnation in the law over time. While an in-depth treatment of
settlement theory is beyond the scope of this article, two points are worth
emphasizing. Concededly, RCS may not be appropriate for blossoming
areas of statutory law in which judges play an important role in clarifying
ambiguities and adding flesh to skeletal legal standards. However, the
marginal value of precedent to a tort system that absorbed the brunt of
the litigation explosion is minimal.129 Second, the value of precedent is
limited to litigation activity preceding the summary judgment phase, at
which time the judge determines whether the plaintiff has argued a valid
claim as a matter of law. The remainder of the trial, in which the parties
dispute which version of the facts the jury should accept, has negligible
value as precedent. Therefore, insofar as RCS encourages settlements
between the summary judgment stage and the end of the trial, it offers
significant advantages over competing alternatives.
B. A Game-Theory Illustration of Litigation Strategy under the
American Rule and RCS
As a new fee-shifting paradigm, RCS alters the financial calculus of
both parties to a civil proceeding by introducing a penalty that is
126.
127.
128.
129.

Fischbach & McLauchlan, supra note 11, at 48.
See id. at 39-40.
See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
See generally OLSON, supra note 2.
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inversely proportional to the strength of each party’s case. The effect of
the RCS penalty on the strategies of the plaintiff and defendant can be
modeled using game theory principles. By way of background, game
theory is used extensively by economic and political theorists to model
decision-making behaviors that involve the choice of a strategy.130 The
“game” can be represented in graphical format by a simple grid that
delineates the possible strategies of each participant and the
consequences of each set of strategies, or strategy profile.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma and a simple variant are useful tools for
understanding the application of game theory to fee-shifting rules. The
Prisoner’s Dilemma hypothesizes that two men (“Alvin” and “Bob”) are
arrested for a crime they committed together.131 They are placed in
separate rooms and interrogated. The questioners inform each prisoner
that if they both plead guilty, they will each serve five years in prison.
However, if they both plead innocent, each will spend only one year in
jail. If one conspirator confesses and the other maintains his innocence,
the confessor will be released as a reward for his cooperation while his
partner serves ten years in prison.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma can be expressed graphically in a two-bytwo matrix, where the first and second numbers in each strategy profile
box represent Alvin and Bob’s “payoff,” respectively:
Bob

Alvin

Innocent
Guilty

Innocent
-1,-1
0,-10

Guilty
-10,0
-5,-5

Alvin and Bob’s decision-making process is analyzed by considering
whether, given a particular position in the strategy matrix, a prisoner can
improve his position by changing his answer, assuming that his coconspirator’s choice remains the same. Thus, if Alvin assumes that Bob
will maintain his innocence, Alvin will spend a year in jail if he also
pleads innocent, but will be released outright if he confesses his guilt. On
the other hand, if Alvin predicts that Bob will plead guilty, Alvin will
spend ten years in prison if he pleads innocent, but just five years if he
admits his guilt. Therefore, Alvin benefits by admitting his guilt
regardless of whether he assumes Bob will confess or maintain his
innocence.
130. See generally DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY (1991); MORTON D.
DAVIS & LANGDON DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION (1997).
131. See generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (1992).
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Since the payoffs in this scenario are identical for Alvin and Bob, the
same reasoning applies to Bob as well. Thus, the strategy profile [Guilty,
Guilty] is an equilibrium position. Indeed, this is a Nash equilibrium, a
position from which no player benefits from changing his strategy,
assuming the other prisoner’s strategy remain the same.132 Since the
strategy profile [Guilty, Guilty] is the only Nash equilibrium133 in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the dominant strategy134 for each player is to
confess.
In the early stages of a tort litigation, the plaintiff and defendant
choose whether to settle their dispute or proceed with litigation. This
decision can be modeled with a strategy matrix similar to the matrix used
to represent the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Consider a hypothetical products
liability lawsuit: Jones v. Garrity Auto Parts (“Garrity”). The brakes on
Jones’s car failed, causing an accident in which Jones sustained minor
injuries. We initially examine Garrity under the American Rule,
employing three assumptions about the costs incurred during this tort
proceeding. First, both parties incur a legal fee of $30,000 for a
settlement and $60,000 for litigation. Second, if Jones is victorious, his
judgment will be in the amount of $300,000. Third, Garrity offers a
settlement amount that varies with the strength of Jones’s case, but is
capped at $200,000.
We now analyze Jones’s decision matrix in three scenarios—where
the probabilities of a favorable judgment are 25 percent, 50 percent, and
75 percent To calculate the payoffs for each strategy profile, we multiply
the amount of the judgment or settlement by its probability of occurring
andthen subtract legal fees.135 Note that the payoffs for the strategy
profiles [Litigate, Settle] and [Settle, Litigate] are equivalent to [Litigate,
Litigate] because the option to settle is feasible only if both parties agree:

132. See FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 130, at 11-14.
133. See id.
134. A strategy is dominant if it always leads to a higher payoff for one player, regardless of
the other player’s choice. In the prisoner’s dilemma, if Bob claims innocence, Alvin would admit
guilt (0) rather than plead innocent (-1). If Bob confesses, Alvin would admit guilt (-5) rather than
plead innocent (-10). The same logic works for Bob’s decision. Therefore, admitting guilt is the
dominant strategy, and claiming innocence is said to be a dominated strategy. See id. at 6-9.
135. Calculations have been rounded to the nearest ten, and the numbers represent thousands
of dollars. See Appendix A for a detailed description of the calculations.
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Jones (75%)

Garrity (25%)

Litigate
Settle

Litigate
-290,170
(-290,170)

Settle
(-290,170)
-180,120

Jones (50%)

Garrity (50%)

Litigate
Settle

Litigate
-210,90
(-210,90)

Settle
(-210,90)
-130,70

Jones (25%)
Garrity (75%)

Litigate
Settle

Litigate
-140,20
(-140,20)

Settle
(-140,20)
-80,20

Under the American Rule, Jones stands to receive a larger payoff by
litigating than settling until his probability of a favorable judgment falls
below 25 percent. Therefore, his dominant strategy will be to litigate all
but the weakest cases. However, note that litigation is always an
inefficient136 option for both parties collectively, in that the total cost of
litigation (the sum of both payoffs in a strategy profile) is higher than the
cost of settlement.
Now consider a variant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which we term
the “Plea Bargain Scenario”. In this game, if one conspirator pleads
guilty and the other pleads innocent, the party that confesses receives a
two-year prison sentence instead of his outright release. This game more
closely models prevailing practice in the criminal justice system, where
prosecutors use plea bargains to reward co-conspirators with reduced—
but not negligible—sentences in return for cooperation. The Plea Bargain
Scenario will have different payoffs than the Prisoner’s Dilemma for the
[Innocent, Guilty] and [Guilty, Innocent] strategy profiles:
Bob
Alvin

Innocent
Guilty

Innocent
-1,-1
-2,-10

Guilty
-10,-2
-5,-5

136. In this context, we can think of efficiency as a measure of the total cost of settling a
dispute, which is the sum of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s costs. Therefore, the most efficient
outcome is the one in which the total cost is minimized.
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This new rule has an important consequence. If Alvin thinks Bob
will plead innocent, then Alvin is better off following suit, and vice
versa. As a result, admitting guilt is no longer the dominant strategy of
each player. Instead, Alvin’s choice of strategy depends on how likely he
thinks Bob is to claim innocence, and vice versa.
Returning to Jones v. Garrity, we can now appreciate how the
behavior of each party would change under the RCS Rule. Just as the
Plea Bargain Scenario modifies the strategy profiles of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, RCS introduces an analogous penalty that eliminates the
dominance of the litigation strategy under the American Rule. In order to
calculate the new payoffs/penalties for each strategy profile, we simply
introduce a probability-adjusted fee-shifting penalty incurred by
litigating parties. This penalty, which is equal to the party’s own legal
costs, is incurred by the party that loses a lawsuit. Therefore, Jones and
Garrity will each multiply their probability of losing the case by the
amount of this penalty and factor the resultant cost into his respective
decision:
Jones (75%)

Garrity (25%)

Litigate
Settle

Litigate
-330,150
(-330,150)

Litigate
Settle

Litigate
-240,60
(-240,60)

Settle
(-330,150)
-180,120

Jones (50%)
Garrity (50%)

Settle
(-240,60)
-130,70

Jones (25%)
Garrity (75%)

Litigate
Settle

Litigate
-150,-30
(-150,-30)

Settle
(-150,-30)
-80,20

Under RCS, the payoffs/penalties remain the same for the strategy
profile [Settle, Settle]. However, three favorable consequences are
evident. First, Jones no longer receives a higher payoff for litigating a
case with a 50 percent or lower probability of favorable judgment. In
other words, RCS has eliminated the plaintiff’s dominant strategy of
litigating cases with questionable merit. Indeed, under RCS, Jones
actually stands to lose money by attempting to litigate a case with less
than a 33 percent probability of a favorable outcome. Second, the fee-
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shifting penalty makes litigation a less favorable option for both parties
in all circumstances, demonstrating that RCS even-handedly encourages
an efficient settlement. Third, when one party has a 75 percent
probability of winning, the range of payoffs/penalties is wider under
RCS than the American Rule, which means that the plaintiff enjoys a
particular advantage when his case has strong merit and vice versa. This
illustrates that in unbalanced civil disputes, RCS tilts the playing field in
favor of the party with the stronger case.
A more complex analysis would reveal further benefits of RCS.
Since Jones still stands to receive a higher payoff by litigating a case
with a 75 percent chance of a favorable outcome, Garrity would probably
offer a higher initial settlement, since he would lose an additional
$40,000 (compared to the American Rule) if the case goes to trial.
Likewise, if Jones’s case is weak, he would be encouraged to accept a
lower initial settlement offer to avoid a fee-shifting penalty at trial.
Therefore, the settlement reached under RCS would be more efficient
than the costly trials so common under the American Rule and more
even-handed than the pro-prevailing plaintiff settlements reached under
state fee-shifting statutes.
Further game theoretic analyses of tort strategies under the American
Rule and RCS could make use of an extensive-form model,137 which
would introduce a temporal element to the game analyzed above. Such
an analysis could demonstrate how the RCS penalty would encourage the
parties to engage in iterative rounds of offers and counteroffers, ideally
converging on a settlement figure that reflects the actual injury suffered
by the plaintiff.
VII. CONCLUSION
Legislators predictably reacted to the litigation explosion by
combining elements of the American Rule and the British Rule in an
attempt to discourage frivolous litigation and ensure that all plaintiffs
with meritorious cases could feasibly access the judicial system.
However, the preoccupation of state legislators with ensuring justice on a
case-by-case basis led to the establishment of fee-shifting rules that
granted excessive discretion to judges and institutionalized a preference
for prevailing plaintiffs over prevailing defendants. These rules were
initially designed by Congress to enforce newly created federal statutory
rights by encouraging plaintiffs to vindicate those rights in court. Not
surprisingly, inefficiencies arose as state legislators applied this federal
137. The games analyzed here are represented in strategic-form, in which both parties choose
their strategies simultaneously, without knowing what the other party has chosen.
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model to older and more established state common law rights of action,
leading reformers to explore alternate fee-shifting schemes that
incorporated a more global view of efficiency while preserving fairness
for individual litigants.
The RCS rule evades the pitfalls of prior state efforts by establishing
an even-handed two-way fee-shifting system that allocates the costs of
legal uncertainty equally to both sides. RCS fundamentally diverges from
earlier rules by laboring at the opposite end of the litigation pipeline to
preserve fairness through the creation of disincentives to non-meritorious
parties rather than incentives to plaintiffs generally. RCS further protects
society by limiting the vulnerability of defendants to non-meritorious
lawsuits, thereby minimizing the price distortions to commodities
ranging from medical care to sports equipment that result from the flow
of settlement surpluses to plaintiffs. By steering parties toward a fair
settlement, RCS redefines optimality in the tort system as efficiency. In
the final analysis, while there may be no talismanic solution to America’s
litigation explosion, RCS may be a crucial first-step toward recasting the
role of litigation in balancing the pursuit of individual redress and the
maximization of social welfare.
APPENDIX A
I. VARIABLES
Cs = legal costs for settlement
Ct = legal costs for litigation
Pp = probability of favorable judgment for plaintiff
Pd = 1 − Pp = probability of favorable judgment for defendant
J = judgment for plaintiff
S = defendant’s maximum settlement offer
F = RCE fee-shifting fraction
II. AMERICAN RULE
Litigate, Litigate = (−Ct − Pp J), (−Ct + Pp J)
Settle, Settle = (−Cs − Pp S), (−Cs + Pp S)
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III. RCE
Litigate, Litigate = (−Ct − PpJ − PpFCt), (−Ct + PpJ − (1-Pp)FCt)
Settle, Settle = (−Cs − Pp S), (−Cs + Pp S)
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